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SEARCH ENGINE TRADE-MARKETING: WHY
TRADEMARK OWNERS CANNOT
MONOPOLIZE USE OF THEIR MARKS IN PAID
SEARCH
I. INTRODUCTION
An April 2011 Google search for the keyword "Rosetta Stone"
returned a sponsored search ad from Rosetta Stone for its language
learning software. But Rosetta Stone was not the only one running
ads triggered by its trademarked keyword.' Google's search
engine results page (SERP)2 also showed ads for three Rosetta
Stone resellers (Amazon, eBay, and Barnes and Noble), two
Rosetta Stone competitors (Livemocha and eLanguage), and one
Rosetta Stone counterfeiter. The title of one of the competitor's
ads was "Don't Buy the Yellow Box." Rosetta Stone had lost paid
search control over its most important asset-its trademark.
This situation occurred because search engines and other
keyword-based advertising providers allow advertisers to bid on
others' trademarks. It is common for competitors, resellers,
affiliates, sellers of complementary products, counterfeiters, and
critics to bid on others' marks. As a result, many advertisers have
sued search engines for trademark infringement. This Article
argues that mark owners bring trademark infringement lawsuits
against search engines in an effort to monopolize the goodwill
associated with their brands. They want complete control over the
use of their marks on the SERP. But trademark law does not give
mark owners such a monopoly.
Consumers are increasingly influencing the SERP's content.
They create much of the content that appears in the organic search
results, including reviews, recommendations, social chatter, and
And they influence the paid search
user-generated videos.
("sponsored") results; the cost and position of paid search ads
depends on the relevancy of those ads to consumers. As a result,
consumers are contributing to a brand's SERP goodwill. The rule
1. Screenshot on file with author.
2. This Article refers to the search engine results page as the "SERP," which
is the common terminology used in the search engine marketing industry.
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that trademark law does not give mark owners the right to
monopolize their marks' applies with even more force on the
SERP, where consumers exert substantial influence over which
marks they want to see. The SERP also cannot insulate a
trademark owner from its competition, even if competitors are
free-riding on the mark owner's goodwill. Fair competition is a
core value of trademark law.
Part II of this Article discusses bidding on others' trademarks in
paid search' and sets out the state of keyword advertising in
trademark law, with emphasis on the Fourth Circuit's April 2012
decision in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.' Part III argues that
bidding on others' marks is not confusing to consumers, and
trademark law does not give mark owners the ability to
Lastly, Part IV highlights recent
monopolize the SERP.'
innovation in keyword advertising' and advocates against chilling
this innovation.'
II. OUR SEARCH-DRIVEN WORLD

Today's SERP is controlled in part by trademark owners. Mark
owners buy paid search ads to promote their brands, and they also
optimize their Web sites to achieve visibility in the organic search
results.
The SERP is also controlled in part by consumers. Consumers
create content around brands-including opinions, reviews, social
chatter, and videos-that appear in the organic results. Consumers
also influence the position and cost of paid search ads by
indicating whether ads are relevant to their search queries.
Relevant ads are less expensive for advertisers and will show up
higher on the SERP; irrelevant ads are more expensive and will
show up further down the SERP. Particularly irrelevant ads will

3. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 611 F.2d 296,
300-01 (9th Cir. 1979).
4. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 50-106 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 116-142 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 230-231 and accompanying text.
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not show up on the SERP at all, no matter how much the advertiser
is willing to pay.
This Part (1) explores the current landscape of keyword
advertising with an emphasis on the consumer-influenced content
of today's SERP,9 (2) discusses the ability of advertisers to bid on
others' trademarks in paid search,'o and (3) sets out the state of
direct and secondary trademark infringement liability as applied to
keyword-based advertising services."
A. The Keyword Advertising Landscape
Keyword advertising is the most popular way for brands to
engage consumers on the Web. Ninety-two percent of searchers
click on paid search ads.12 U.S. advertisers spent $18.7 billion on
paid search ads in 2011, the highest of any online marketing
medium." Marketers spent most of this money on Google, which
held a 66.4 percent search market share as of February 2012.14
In 2011, Google drove $36.5 billion in advertising revenue, most
AdWords enables
of this through its AdWords product. 5
sponsored
trigger
that
keywords
on
bid
advertisers to
advertisements on a cost-per-click ("CPC") basis each time a
searcher clicks on a sponsored ad. AdWords advertisers bid the
amount they wish to pay per click, and Google ranks advertisers'
ads by combining the advertiser's bid with relevancy factors called
9. See infra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 50-106 and accompanying text.
12. Press Release, Performics, Search Engine Usage Study: 92 Percent of
2010),
(Sept.
28,
Results
on
Sponsored
Click
Searchers
http://www.performics.com/news-room/press-releases/Search-Engine-UsageStudy-92-Percent/1422.
13. Interactive Marketing Spend to Hit $76.6B in 2016, AD AGE (Aug. 24,
http://adage.com/article/digital/interactive-marketing-spend-hit-76-6b2011),
2016/229444/.
14. Press Release, comScore, Inc., comScore Releases February 2012 U.S.
at
available
2011),
9,
(Mar.
Rankings
Engine
Search
http://www.comscore.com/PressEvents/PressReleases/2012/3/comScoreRele
ases February_2012_U.S._SearchEngine Rankings.
15. 2011

Financial

Tables,

GOOGLE

INVESTOR

RELATIONS,

http://investor.google.com/financialtables.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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"Quality Score."1 6 Thus, Google's advertising auction-as well as
Bing's-is not purely bid-based." Quality Score includes factors
like the rate at which consumers click on an ad ("click-through
rate")' 8 and the quality of the landing page associated with the ad.' 9
Google's Quality Score approach fosters paid search results that
are more relevant to consumers-ads that have high quality scores
can rank higher than less-relevant ads that have higher bids.20
Additionally, Google will not display ads that do not meet a
certain Quality Score threshold because these ads are irrelevant to
searchers. 2 1 Google has placed high importance on Quality Score
for top-sponsored paid search ads (the ads that show in the lightcolored box above the organic results).22 To show in the topsponsored box, an ad must meet a certain high Quality Score
threshold.2 3 Google established its paid search dominance through
relevancy, powered by the Quality Score approach.
And Google is constantly striving to make its search results
more relevant. For example, Google updated its organic search
algorithm in January 2011 to remove "content farms" from the
organic results. 24 Content farms are content-aggregation and
scrapper sites that provide consumers with low-quality, often
irrelevant content. 25 Google (and Bing) are also striving to make
16. MIKE MORAN & BILL HUNT, SEARCH ENGINE MARKETING,
DRIVING SEARCH TRAFFIC TO YOUR COMPANY'S WEB SITE 42 (2d ed.

INC.:

2009);

What Is the AdWords Quality Score and How Is It Calculated, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer--10215
(last visited Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinafter CalculatingQuality Score].
17. Id. The search engines have not revealed the exact weight of Quality
Score versus bid.
18. MORAN & HUNT, supranote 16, at 42.
19. CalculatingQuality Score, supra note 16.
20. MORAN & HUNT, supra note 16, at 42.
21. See Calculating Quality Score, supra note 16.
22. Improvements to Ad Quality, GOOGLE INSIDE ADWORDS (Oct. 30, 2008,
3:52
PM),
http://adwords.blogspot.com/2008/1 0/improvements-to-adsquality.html.
23. Id.
24. Google Search and Search Engine Spam, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG
(Jan. 21, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/201 1/01/googlesearch-and-search-engine-spam.html.
25. Id.
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the SERP more relevant by making it more social. The SERP is
increasingly being influenced by consumers and the content they
create, which is called "earned content." The SERP is amplifying
consumer opinions by incorporating earned content-product
reviews, user-generated videos, chatter from social networking
sites, and Web page recommendations. For instance, Google's +1
Button-announced in March 2011-allows searchers to "+1" (or
"like") paid or organic search results.26 Other searchers can then
see when people-including their friends-have liked particular
results, which may boost click-through for those results.
According to Google, "[s]ometimes it's easier to find exactly what
you're looking for when someone you know already found it."27
The Google +1 Button is word of mouth marketing on the SERP.
Google also uses the +1 Button as a ranking signal for search
results. 28 For instance, if an organic search listing has a large
number of +1s, Google may rank that listing higher in the results
because consumers have verified that it is a useful page. In paid
search, an ad that has a lot of +1s will likely garner more clicks.
This will boost the ad's Quality Score and, in turn, the ad's
positions within the paid search results. As +1 rolls out to the
SERPs, it would also make sense for Google to include the number
of +1s that an ad has as a factor in the ad's Quality Score.
The SERP is also becoming the consumer's own personal space.
Search results are personalized based on location, search history,
and Web-browsing history.2 9 When logged into Google, searchers
can move results up and down, as well as delete results they do not
deem relevant. Over time, searchers can create SERPs that are
highly personalized and relevant. Thus, the SERP's content is
26. Google +1 Button, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/+1/button/ (last
visited Nov. 23, 2011).
27. Google Is +1 Step Closer to a Social SERP: Google's +1 Button &
Implications for Advertisers, PERFORMICS BLOG (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://blog.performics.com/search/2011/04/google-is-1-step-closer-to-a-socialserp-googles- 1-button-implications-for-advertisers.html. (internal quotations
omitted).
28. See id.
GOOGLE,
Details,
Customization
Search
e.g.,
29. See,
http://www.google.com/support/websearch/bin/answer.py?answer-9370 4 (last
visited Nov. 23, 2011).
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increasingly being influenced by the "Web democracy"-the
consumer. Brand owners have less control. There is no other
marketplace where consumers exert such influence over the
trademarks they wish to see.
B. Bidding on Others' Trademarks in PaidSearch
Since 2004, Google's keyword policy has allowed U.S.
advertisers to bid on others' trademarks.30 Since 2009, Google has
allowed advertisers to use others' trademarks and in their ad copy
in four situations: (1) the advertiser is a reseller of the trademarked
product, (2) the advertiser sells components of the trademarked
product, (3) the advertiser sells goods that are compatible with the
trademarked product, or (4) the advertiser provides information. on
the trademarked product.31 Google also currently allows European
advertisers to bid on others' marks but not to use those marks in ad
text (except in the United Kingdom and Ireland).32 In 2011,
Microsoft-which controls Bing and Yahoo! Search-also started
to allow advertisers to bid on others' marks and use those
trademarks in ad copy." The search engines hold the advertisers
responsible for ensuring that they do not violate others' marks.
They also prohibit the advertising of counterfeit goods."
Many types of advertisers can benefit from bidding on
others' trademarks (called "paid search conquesting" in the search
engine marketing industry).
These advertisers include
30. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-2007, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
7082, at *9-10 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2012).
31. Id. at *10.
32. What Is Google's Trademark Policy for Resellers and Informational
Sites?,
GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/
answer.py?hl=en&answer-145626 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
33. See Intellectual Property Guidelines, MICROSOFT ADVERTISING,
http://advertising.microsoft.com/support-center/search-advertising/intellectualproperty-guidelines (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
34. Id.; What Is Google's AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy?,
GOOGLE,

http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6118 (last
visited Nov. 23, 2011).
35. Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 33; What Is Google's
AdWords andAdSense Trademark Policy?,supra note 34.
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competitors, resellers, affiliates, complementary product sellers,
counterfeiters, critics, and parodists. For example, retailer A could
implement a Google conquesting campaign to gain market share
from its competitor, retailer B. In an effort to divert retailer B's
consumers to its own Web site, retailer A could bid on retailer B's
trademarked keywords. The keywords could trigger ad copy that
features a compelling "50% off' offer for retailer A's products.
Many of the visitors to retailer A's site from the conquesting
campaign may be first-time (new-to-file) customers. Some may
buy the retailer's products. While retailer A sold legitimate goods,
other paid search advertisers employ similar conquesting strategies
to sell counterfeit goods.3 6
Affiliates also commonly bid on others' trademarks. An affiliate
generates Web traffic, leads, or sales for a brand in exchange for
commissions. The affiliate is under contract with the brand and
agrees to certain terms such as not bidding above the brand in paid
search. For example, an affiliate like Groupon will bid on "Gap
coupons" when Gap is offering a Groupon, and Gap would allow
that. But other affiliates can be problematic for brand owners. An
affiliate may violate its contract with the trademark owner by
bidding above the mark owner. Other sites may pose as affiliates
of a brand when they really are not. To illustrate, at the start of
2011, travel aggregator" SmartFares.com was bidding on the
"Southwest Airlines" keyword." But Southwest does not sell
through affiliates.39 SmartFares was trying to bait searchers
interested in Southwest's flights to buy flights from airlines that
SmartFares was affiliated with.
Paid search conquesting is not always about driving sales or
commissions. In February 2011, the American Society for the
36. See generally Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082.
37. Travel aggregators are Web sites like Cheapflights.com or Kayak.com
that aggregate airline fares, hotel rates, or car rental rates from multiple online
travel agencies (OTAs) like Delta.com. The aggregator displays results from
various OTAs on one screen for the user. The aggregator then charges the OTA
a commission for a sale.
38. Screenshots on file with author.
39. See Vidya Drego, Southwest Fares ONLY Available on Southwest.com,
FORRESTER BLOGS (Oct. 22, 2010), http://blogs.forrester.com/vidyadrego/1010-22-southwestfares onlyavailable on southwestcom.
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) was showing paid
search ads keyed to the "Purina dog food" keyword.4 0 The ads
said, "Get The Latest Details On Pet Food Recalls. Keep Your Pet
Safe." The ads linked to a page on the ASPCA's site that
informed potential Purina customers that Purina had been recalled
in the past for causing severe-often-fatal-kidney problems in
dogs.4 1
C. Issuesfor Trademark Owners
Because of Google's large market share, many trademark
owners feel compelled to bid on their marks-thus paying for
clicks-to protect their goodwill.42 Some trademark owners would
not bid on their brand names if others could not conquest; from a
search engine marketing perspective, it is not always necessary to
bid on a brand.
The Rosetta Stone example illustrates this issue.43
if
conquestors were not allowed to bid on Rosetta Stone's mark,
Rosetta Stone may not have to bid on the "Rosetta Stone" keyword
because RosettaStone.com ranks one, two, and three in organic
search for the keyword. Google created a competitive paid search
market for the keyword, which would not have existed if not for
conquesting. Google can sit back and collect click costs from
Rosetta Stone, the resellers, the competitors, and the
counterfeiters. There is no doubt that Google generates more
revenue by allowing conquesting. Conquesting has contributed to
Google's consistently large year-over-year advertising revenue
growth rates.44
Additionally, if an advertiser is not the only one competing on
its brand keywords, that advertiser may have to increase bids to
maintain position. However, most conquestors could not achieve
40. Screenshot on file with author.
41. See Pet Food Recalls, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/pet-care/pet-foodrecall-overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
42. Brief for Carfax, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting PlaintiffAppellant at 23 n.5, Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531
(E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 10-2007), 2010 WL 4306014.
43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
44. See 2011 FinancialTables, supra note 15.
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high enough quality scores to compete (i.e. rank above) a
trademark owner who is in the auction for its trademarked terms.
Highly relevant resellers-like Amazon or eBay-are the most
likely to inflate CPCs when bidding against a trademark owner.
In addition to raising advertising costs, many advertisers are
offended that conquestors can free-ride on their trademarks to
boost visibility. Free-riders include competitors, rogue affiliates,
and counterfeiters. For example, software counterfeiters bid on the
"Rosetta Stone" keyword.45 When Rosetta Stone identifies an
infringing ad, it sends the search engine a take-down notice."
Rosetta Stone claims that it takes the search engines between one
day and one month to remove the infringing ads;4 7 however, search
engines would likely dispute that delay. In the meantime, the
counterfeiters transact with consumers who click on the ads.48
When an infringing ad is removed, counterfeiters create new ads
associated with new counterfeiter domains, mostly offshore to
avoid U.S. law enforcement.4 9
Because of these concerns, advertisers have sued keyword-based
advertising services.
D. TrademarkInfringement Lawsuits Against Keyword-Based
Advertising Services
In the early days of keyword advertising, Playboy sued Netscape
for using the "Playboy" keyword to trigger paid search ads for
In Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape
Playboy's competitors."
Communications Corporation, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that Netscape's use of Playboy's mark could confuse
consumers even though Netscape only used the mark internally to
45. Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act: Hearing on S.
3804 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of
at
available
Stone),
Rosetta
CEO,
Adams,
Tom
11-2-16%20Adams%20Testimony.pdf.
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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trigger the ads (i.e. consumers could not see the mark)." Thus,
Netscape could be liable for direct trademark infringement.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went in a
different direction than the Ninth Circuit in the early cases. In 1800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenUcom, Inc., the Second Circuit created
a "trademark use" requirement in keyword cases.52 Under the
trademark use doctrine, a party cannot face liability for trademark
infringement unless it "'use[d]' a mark as a brand in connection
with the offering of goods and services,"" thus "causing the public
to see the protected mark and associate the infringer's goods and
services with those of the mark holder." 54 In 1-800 Contacts,
WhenU.com-an early keyword-based advertising service-used
the 1800contacts.com URL as a keyword to internally trigger popup advertisements for 1-800 Contact's competitors.
The court
held that this did not constitute trademark use because the internal
keyword could not be seen by consumers.
Four years later, the Second Circuit reversed course in
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. Here, Google unsuccessfully
relied on 1-800 Contacts's trademark use requirement. Unlike in
1-800 Contacts, the court found that Google "used" the
RESCUECOM trademark even though Google, like WhenU.com,
only used the trademark internally-invisible to consumers-to
trigger paid search ads for Rescuecom's competitors.5 ' The court
found that Google took a more active role than WhenU.com did
because Google promoted the sale of Rescuecom's trademark
through its Keyword Suggestion Tool." Google's ad-serving
platform also differed from WhenU.com; unlike Google,

51. Id. at 1024.
52. See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,
407-08 (2d Cir. 2005).
53. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and ConsumerSearch
Costs on the Internet, 41 HoUS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2004).
54. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003).
55. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 409.
56. Id.
57. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2009).
58. Id. at 129.
59. Id.
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WhenU.com's ads popped up in a separate window.60 Thus, on
Google, consumers were less able to differentiate the ads from the
site content they were looking for. The Rescuecom court held that
the Lanham Act contains no "use" threshold.6' It also held that
Google's use did not need to be visible to consumers for Google to
be eligible for infringement.6 2 The relevant inquiry was whether
Google's practice of selling keywords was likely to cause
consumer confusion.
After Rescuecom, the trademark use doctrine is dead in keyword
cases-at least in the Second Circuit.' Because keyword-based
advertising services could no longer rely on the doctrine, the door
was open for other trademark infringement lawsuits, like Rosetta
Stone. Under the confusion standard, Google is forced to litigate
case by case and fact by fact.
Rosetta Stone sued Google in 2010 for trademark infringement
and contributory trademark infringement for allowing advertisers
to use its keywords to trigger paid search ads.65 in some instances,
the ad copy and URLs included the ROSETTA STONE mark.66
These ads diverted people searching for "Rosetta Stone" to
counterfeiters, competitors, and resellers.6 7 Some searchers even
purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone software through the ads.6"
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
60. Id. at 128.
61. Id. at 132.
62. Id. at 129.
63. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131.
64. However, the trademark use doctrine is alive in European keyword cases.
In Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) held that Google did not use the LOUIS VUITTON mark "in the course
of trade." Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier, 2010 ECR 1-02417, 56 (Mar. 23, 2010). Thus, Google is absolutely
immune from trademark infringement in conquesting cases in the European
Union's twenty-seven countries, where trademark infringement law has been
harmonized. However, Google's advertisers may still be liable for trademark
infringement.
65. Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *11.
66. Id.
67. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (E.D. Va.
2010).
68. Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *11.
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Virginia granted Google's motion for summary judgment on the
trademark infringement claim; however, in April 2012, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the order and remanded
the case for further proceedings.69
The district court did not focus on whether Google "used" the
ROSETTA STONE mark. Rather, it focused on whether Google
used the mark in a manner likely to confuse ordinary consumers as
to the source or sponsorship of the goods. 0 Five consumers
testified that they searched for "Rosetta Stone" and then bought
counterfeit software through conquesting ads." Yet, the district
court rejected the consumers' testimony because the consumers
knew "they were not purchasing the products directly from Rosetta
Stone."72 Moreover, consumers "were not confused by the
Sponsored Links, but by the confusing nature of the websites from
which they purchased."" Even though the consumers were misled
into clicking on the ads, the district court rejected Rosetta Stone's
argument that this initial interest confusion constituted trademark
infringement."
Initial interest confusion is confusion that is
dispelled before an actual sale occurs."
These holdings did not stand on appeal as the Fourth Circuit
held that "a reasonable trier of fact could find that Google intended
to cause confusion in that it acted with the knowledge that
confusion was very likely to result from its use of the marks."76 In
analyzing source confusion, the Fourth Circuit focused not on
Google's policy of allowing advertisers to bid on others'
trademarks, but Google's policy of allowing advertisers to use

69. Id. at *12, *74.
70. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 541-45.
71. Id. at 543.
72. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
73. Id. at 544.
74. Id.
75. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Although ... consumers know they are patronizing
[defendant's site] rather than [plaintiffs site], there is nevertheless initial
interest confusion in the sense that, by . . . divert[ing] people looking for

[plaintiffs mark] to its web site, [defendant] improperly benefits from the
goodwill that [plaintiff] developed in its mark.").
76. Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *24.
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others' marks within the ad copy.n The court stated, "Indeed,
internal studies performed by Google [prior to 2009, when Google
revised its policy to allow some ads to use trademarks in the ad
copy] suggested that there was significant source confusion among
Internet searchers when trademarks were included in the title or
body of advertisements.""
The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court erred in
rejecting the testimony of the consumers that had purchased
counterfeit Rosetta Stone software through sponsored links."
Although the consumers were not confused as to the source of
their purchases, the Fourth Circuit noted that they were confused
as to the sponsorship of the goods, which could constitute
infringement." The Fourth Circuit quoted one of the consumers:
"What attracted us to this particular [counterfeiter sponsored link
from bossdisk.com domain] was that they presumed to be a
Additional evidence that the district
Rosetta Stone reseller."
court erred in rejecting included (1) testimony by two of Google's
in-house attorneys that "they were unable to determine without
more research which sponsored links were authorized resellers of
ROSETTA STONE products,"82 (2) a consumer confusion survey
prepared for Rosetta Stone by an expert that indicated that
seventeen percent of consumers "are likely to be confused as to the
affiliation, endorsement, or association of the websites linked to
those 'sponsored links' with Rosetta Stone,"" and (3) a Google
that "even well-educated, seasoned Internet
internal study
consumers are confused by the nature of Google's sponsored links
and are sometimes even unaware that sponsored links are, in
actuality, advertisements."8 4
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit overruled the district court's
holding on the functionality doctrine. The district court held that
the functionality doctrine protected Google's use of the ROSETTA
77. See id. at *22-24.
78. Id. at *23.

79. Id. at *26.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at *27.
Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *26.
Id at *31.
Id. at *32-33.
Id. at *36.
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STONE mark as a keyword and immunized Google from
trademark infringement." A product feature is functional "if it is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article."" The functionality doctrine prevents a
trademark owner from "inhibiting legitimate competition by . . .
control[ling] a useful product feature."" The district court found
that keywords-like "Rosetta Stone"-"have an essential indexing
function" as they enable Google to match search results with
However, the Fourth Circuit held that the
users' queries."
"The
functionality doctrine did not apply in this case:
functionality analysis below was focused on whether Rosetta
Stone's mark made Google's product more useful, neglecting to
consider whether the mark was functional as Rosetta Stone used it.
. . . Clearly there is nothing functional about Rosetta Stone's use of

its own mark."89 The district court in Rosetta Stone erred in
applying the functionality doctrine to Google, the defendant.
Under Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., the functionality
doctrine bars protection of a useful product feature of the
90
Likewise, in
producer's-not the defendant's-product.
Playboy, the Ninth Circuit rejected Netscape's argument that its
use of Playboy's trademarks to trigger ads was functional.9' There,
the court stated, "that the marks make defendants' computer
program more functional is irrelevant."92 The fact that keywords
make Google's algorithm more functional is similarly irrelevant.

85. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 545-46.
86. Id. (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,
32 (2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
87. Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164
(1995)).
88. Id. at 546.
89. Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS at *42.
90. See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164
(1995).
91. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1031.
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
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E. ContributoryInfringement and Search Engines
Rosetta Stone also brought a contributory trademark
infringement claim against Google.9 3 To analyze a contributory
trademark infringement claim against a search engine, we must
start with the Supreme Court's decision in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,Inc. from 1982. In Inwood, the United
States Supreme Court held that a manufacturer or distributor is
liable for contributory trademark infringement if it (1)
"intentionally induces another to infringe" or (2) "continues to
supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement."9 4
Tifany Inc. v. eBay Inc. extended the Inwood standard to online

intermediaries who do not actually manufacture or distribute goods
or services.9 5 In Tifany, third parties were selling counterfeit
Tiffany goods on eBay.96 Because Tiffany filed complaints, eBay
had "generalized" knowledge that its platform could be used to
engage in trademark infringement through counterfeiting." But
the court held that this generalized knowledge was not enough; the
law required more "specific" knowledge of individual instances of
actual infringement beyond those addressed after eBay learned of
them." "Contributory liability may arise where a defendant is (as
was eBay here) made aware that there was infringement on its site
but (unlike eBay here) ignored that fact."99 The Rosetta Stone
district court later used this standard to determine that Google was
not liable for contributory infringement: "Like Tiffany, Rosetta
Stone fails to show that Google knew of the [counterfeiting]
However, the Fourth
activity by its AdWords advertisers."'
Circuit vacated the district court's order granting summary
93. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 548.
94. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
95. See generally Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
96. Id. at 97.
97. Id. at 107.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 110 n.15.
100. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (refusing to recognize that the
Keyword Suggestion Tool directed or influenced advertisers to bid on Rosetta
Stone's marks).
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judgment in favor of Google on contributory infringement, noting
that "the Tiffany court did not view the evidence through the lense
of summary judgment; rather, Tiffany involved an appeal of
judgment after a lengthy bench trial. ... the [Tiffany] district court
[unlike the Rosetta Stone district court] appropriately weighed the
evidence sitting as a trier of fact]."''
Opponents of paid search conquesting argue that Google is
contributorially liable for trademark infringement because it
suggests-through its Keyword Suggestion Tool-that advertisers
bid on the trademarks of their competitors to attract consumers.'02
However, although its order was vacated, the Rosetta Stone district
court concluded that "the mere existence of a tool that assists
advertisers in optimizing their advertisements does not, in itself,
indicate intent to induce infringement.""'
Additionally, the Rosetta Stone district court found that Google
does not induce its advertisers to infringe because it informs them
that "they are responsible for the keywords selected and for
ensuring that their use of the keywords does not violate any
applicable laws."' 04
In holding that eBay and Google were not contributorially liable,
both the Second Circuit in Tiffany and the Rosetta Stone district
court emphasized that private market forces-not the enforcement
of trademark law-would best control counterfeiters. The Tiffany
court found that
private market forces give eBay and those operating
similar businesses a strong incentive to minimize
the counterfeit goods sold on their websites. eBay
received many complaints from users claiming to
have been duped into buying counterfeit Tiffany
products sold on eBay. . . . The risk of alienating

101.
102.
103.
104.

Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS at *50.
See, e.g., Brief for Carfax, Inc. et al., supra note 42, at 11-13.
Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
Id. at 548.
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those users gives eBay a reason to identify and
remove counterfeit listings.1 15
Similarly, the Rosetta Stone district court found that
it is in Google's own business interest .

.

. not to

confuse its users .... Google's success depends on
users finding relevant responses to their inquiries...
. Even if it is true that Google stands to profit
financially from higher click-through rates, its long
term financial loss would far exceed its immediate
gains if it provided search services without regard
to possible counterfeiting operations. If Google
intentionally confuses its users and deprives them
of a positive experience, traffic at its website will
decrease, causing it to lose revenue.'06

With the death of the trademark use doctrine in Rescuecom
and the rejection of the functionality doctrine in Rosetta Stone, the
primary issues in keyword cases are now consumer confusion and
contributory infringement. In holding that a trier of fact could
possibly find that Google's keyword policy-or at least the use of
others' trademarks within ad copy-confuses consumers, the
Fourth Circuit, in Rosetta Stone, opened the door even wider than
Rescuecom for lawsuits against keyword-advertising platforms.
As outlined in the next Part, these lawsuits should fail.
III. THE TRADEMARK OWNER, THE CONSUMER, AND THE SERP

Trademark owners sue search engines in an effort to monopolize
the goodwill of their marks on the SERP. However, trademark law
does not allow trademark owners the right to monopolize use of
their marks on the SERP, especially because searchers are
increasingly determining exactly ,which trademarks they want to
see. Furthermore, trademark law does not protect mark owners
105. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109.
106. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
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from SERP competition, even if competitors are free-riding on
mark owners' goodwill.?1
This Part argues that finding search engines liable for trademark
infringement impermissibly gives mark owners more rights than
trademark law entitles them.'0 o It then determines that search
engine practices-including (1) allowing advertisers to use others'
trademarks to trigger ads (and use those trademarks in ad copy),'0 9
(2) suggesting keywords through the Keyword Suggestion Tool,"0
(3) displaying brands in proximity to each other,"' and (4) not
clearly differentiating between paid and organic results' ' 2-should
not trigger trademark infringement liability. Lastly, this Part
evaluates the theory,of potential liability for search engines" and
discusses concerns around not using trademark law to regulate
conquesting, including (1) information overloadll 4 and (2)
Google's power over mark holders."'
A. FindingSearch Engines Liablefor Trademark Infringement
Gives Mark Owners a Monopoly

In enacting the Lanham Act in 1946, Congress justified
protecting trademarks to (1) "protect the public" so that it gets the
product it asks for and wants and (2) ensure that the investment a
trademark owner makes in the mark is protected from
"misappropriation by pirates and cheats.""' Trademark law is thus

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
1274.

See infra notes 116-119
See infra notes 116-226
See infra notes 150-162
See infra notes 163-165
See infra notes 166-181
See infra notes 182-196
See infra notes 202-213
See infra notes 197-201
See infra notes 214-226
S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss2/4

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
1 (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
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"designed to protect consumers from being misled"'"7 not to
further "perpetuate product monopolies""' or maximize profits for
mark owners."'
Rosetta Stone sued Google to stop counterfeiters from bidding
on its mark.120 It does have a problem with counterfeiters; an April
2011 Google search for "Rosetta Stone" returned an ad from one
offshore counterfeiter.121 But Rosetta Stone and its amici are
concerned about much more than counterfeiters.12 2 The Google
search for "Rosetta Stone" also returned ads for two of Rosetta
Stone's competitors (Livemocha and eLanguage).123 The title of
Livemocha's conquesting ad was "Don't Buy the Yellow Box." 24
In reality, Rosetta Stone and its amici want complete control over
their trademarks on the SERP; they want to eliminate the
counterfeiter's ad along with the competitors' ads (and perhaps the
resellers', aggregators', and affiliates' ads). In his seminal article,
Advertising in the Public Interest, trademark scholar Professor
Ralph Brown nicely summed up this motivation, which is rooted in
unjust enrichment: "Plaintiffs come into court with moral
accusations of unfair competition, which are in fact often aimed at
the elimination of competition." 2 5
117. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 301
(9th Cir. 1979) (quoting HMH Publ'g Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
118. Id. (citing Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566-69 (9th Cir. 1968)).
119. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The MerchandisingRight: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 484 (2005).
120. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
121. Screenshot on file with author.
122. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 539 ("Rosetta stone alleges that . .
Google is helping [conquestors] misdirect web users to websites of companies
that (i) compete with Rosetta Stone, (ii) sell language education programs from
Rosetta Stone's competitors, (iii) sell counterfeit Rosetta Stone products, or (iv)
are entirely unrelated to language education.").
123. Screenshot on file with author.
124. Id.
125. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948). Brown also
noted that, if unchecked, "the drive for monopoly advantage ... would no doubt
patent the wheel, copyright the alphabet, and register the sun and moon as
exclusive trade-marks." Id.
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Rosetta Stone's motivation is reminiscent of Tiffany's in Tiffany
v. eBay. Tiffany claimed that it wanted to stop counterfeit Tiffany
sales on eBay, but it really wanted to stop all Tiffany sales on
eBay in order to monopolize its resale market. But trademark
law's first sale doctrine 2 6 does not allow Tiffany to monopolize its
resale market. Similarly, Rosetta Stone wants to monopolize the
SERP, eliminating all competition-counterfeiters, competitors,
and resellers-but trademark law does not give it that right.
Consider a brand that is not susceptible to counterfeiting, such
as Ford Motor Company, which joined in an amicus brief in favor
of Rosetta Stone in the Rosetta Stone case.'27 Ford wants to stop
its competitors from using its goodwill to.drive consumers to their
websites.' 28 Ford would argue that it has invested heavily in its
trademark, and therefore is entitled to all the goodwill of the mark.
But Ford's customers have also invested in its mark-Ford has
built its goodwill with its customers' money, participation, and
collaboration.' 29 Consumers do not just buy brands anymore, "they
join them."' A valuable trademark is thus the result of "mutual
investment by producers and consumers." 3' Trademark law gives
brands incentive for investing in goodwill, but it does not give
them all of the value derived from that goodwill.'3 2

126. See Louis

4 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR
§ 22:45 (4th ed. 2011). "Once
the trademark-holder has sanctioned the release of the goods into the stream of
commerce, however, [its] right of control is exhausted, and the subsequent sale
of that item cannot serve as the basis for an infringement suit." Id.
127. See generally Brief for Carfax, Inc. et al., supra note 42.
128. See generally id.
129. See generally Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1998).
130. Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 585, 616 (2002).
131. Litman, supra note 129, at 1733.
132. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 62, at 791. "Legal protection for trade
symbols, in the absence of confusion, disserves competition and thus the
consumer. It arrogates to the producer the entire value of cultural icons that we
should more appropriately treat as collectively owned." Id. See also Litman,
supra note 121, at 1719.
ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,

COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
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The rule that trademark law does not give mark owners the right
13
applies with even more force on the
to monopolize their marksm
SERP, where consumers exert substantial influence over which
trademarks they wish to see. The SERP's content is not entirely
controlled by trademark owners.134 On the SERP, a brand's
goodwill comes from the brand's own paid and organic results, but
it also comes from consumer word-of-mouth like social media
chatter, Facebook "Likes," reviews, Google +1s, and usergenerated videos. Additionally, in paid search, consumers exert
influence over ads. If a consumer sees a conquesting ad he deems
irrelevant, he does not click on it. If a conquestor dupes a
consumer into clicking on an ad, that consumer quickly bounces
from the landing page. The ad's Quality Score then suffers and it
falls down-or even off-the SERP. But if a consumer sees a
conquesting ad he deems relevant, he clicks on it and does not
bounce from the landing page, and the ad's Quality Score
improves.
Quality Score is revolutionary in advertising because it gives
some control back to consumers. In 1948, Ralph Brown wrote
[W]hat is the position of the customer in a world
ruled by advertising? From the time he picks up his
morning paper until he switches off the radio at
bedtime he is bombarded with literally thousands of
trade symbols. He goes to work in a public
conveyance papered with them. His way is lined
with billboards and shop windows proclaiming
them. He checks the date from an advertiser's
calendar, winnows a harvest of leaflets from his
mail, closes the window against a sound truck and
perhaps escapes for a few hours. Then on his return
home he exposes himself to a stupefying flow of
persuasion from the radio. When he ventures into a
store to perform the act of buying, myriads of
symbols, attached to exhortations, pleas, reminders,
and threats, stir uneasily in his subconscious, while
133. See Anti-Monopoly, 611 F.2d at 300-01.
134. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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hundreds more dance before his eyes from
packages, posters, and animated displays. Is he
confused? Undoubtedly.135

Minus the sound trucks, Brown's story of unavoidable
trademarks and inevitable confusion rings much truer today. But
the SERP is changing that. Brown wrote that "the foundation of
free choice

. . .

is an adequate presentation of alternatives."136

Consumers search for trademarks on Google, see an adequate
presentation of alternatives, and indicate to Google whether each
alternative is relevant. Google then uses these searcher cuesclick-through rates, +Is, landing page bounce rates-to create a
more relevant page for the next search. Thus, today's SERP
allows consumers to break through the "stupefying flow" of
trademarks that they are exposed to every minute of every day,
parsing out what is relevant and what is not. Over time, searchers
build SERPs that are highly relevant to their specific needs.
Consumers control their SERPs; they do not need trademark law's
help. Over-aggressive trademark law could exclude conquesting
ads that consumers deem relevant.
Furthermore, trademark law does not provide mark owners the
right to exclude SERP competition. Giving trademark owners
absolute control over their marks on the SERP can stifle
competition by erecting barriers to entry."' In a number of
circumstances, competitors have the right to use others'
trademarks to divert consumer attention to their own products.'
For instance, in Smith v. Chanel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit allowed a
knock-off perfume manufacturer to advertise, "[w]e dare you to try

135. Brown, supra note 125, at 1196.
136. Id. at 1182.
137. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 53, at 788.
138. Id. at 796 (citing Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1910)
(allowing the defendant to use the plaintiffs trademark "to tell the public what
they are doing and to get whatever share they can in the popularity of the
[trademarked product] by advertising that they are trying to make the same
article and think they can succeed")). "Trademark law requires more than
likelihood of diversion-it requires likelihood of confusion." Id. at 822.
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and Ta'Ron's 2nd

Chance... ." Such comparative uses do not confuse consumers.
Additionally, "brand spillover" has always existed; third parties
regularly increase profits by taking advantage of others'
goodwill.'4 0 To illustrate, Ford-through television commercials,
sponsorships, billboards, or online display ads-may spur a
consumer to search on Google for "Ford trucks." But in a market
economy, that search does not give Ford the right to that
consumer. Ford is entitled to no more than the right to continue to
compete against its rivals. Paid search conquesting fosters this
competition by informing the "Ford trucks" searcher that a Chevy
may be a better fit in terms of price or quality. The SERP cannot
insulate Ford from its competitors, even if its competitors are freeriding on its goodwill; "this unjust enrichment instinct runs counter
to the core values of trademark law, which make the value of fair
competition paramount."l 4 '
When a
Free-riding is nothing more than competition.
trademark owner's interest in protecting goodwill conflicts with a
competitor's interest in market access, competitor and consumer
interests prevail.'42
B. Consumers Are Not Confused on the SERP
Keywords cases must be decided under the consumer
confusion standard because (1) Rescuecom killed the trademark
use doctrine and (2) in Rosetta Stone, the Fourth Circuit rejected
the district court's functionality holding.
Because search engines are not protected by trademark use or
functionality, we must accept a reactive view of trademark law,
which "relegates trademark law to the role of discerning and
139. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1968).
140. See generally Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
381 (2009).
141. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 53, at 783.
142. Id. at 792 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122
(1938) ("Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of [Shredded
Wheat]; and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the skill and
judgment of [the plaintiff] and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in
advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair.")).
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protecting extant consumer understanding." 4 3 Trademark use
theorists, on the other hand, hold a proactive view, which employs
trademark law "to influence the norms that govern consumers'
shopping habits."'" The reactive view leaves open the possibility
that search engines could be liable for trademark infringement if
they caused or intended to cause reasonable consumer confusion.'45
However-despite the Fourth Circuit's language in Rosetta
Stone-search engines do not cause that confusion.
If an advertiser bids on another's mark to provide consumers
with accurate information, the consumer is not confused.'46
Consumers are not confused by referential use, comparative
advertising, gripe, or parody. Conquestors may succeed in
diverting consumers, but trademark law does not protect against
diversion.'4 7 For instance, the ASPCA's ability to show ads for the
"Purina dog food"'48 keyword provided consumers with accurate
information about the Purina recall. If the ASPCA's goal was to
divert consumers from Purina, those consumers were likely glad to
be diverted because the ASPCA gave them valuable information
that they otherwise may not have discovered. Even if some
consumers are confused, trademark law tolerates some confusion.
To infringe, a use must confuse a reasonable amount of prudent,
experienced web-shoppers.14
Some conquestors-like counterfeiters, resellers, affiliates, and
some competitors-bid on others' trademarks not only to divert
consumers, but also to confuse them. However, this confusion is
an issue between the trademark owner and the conquestor, not the
search engine. In the case of search engines, courts should focus
only on what happens on the SERP. On the SERP, search engines
(1) use keywords-perhaps suggested by the Keyword Suggestion
143. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1597, 1604 (2006)
(advocating a reactive view).
144. Id. at 1604.
145. See generally id.
146. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 53, at 820.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
149. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th
Cir. 2010).
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Tool-to trigger ad copy, (2) display brands in proximity to each
other, and (3) present organic and paid results in some kind of
manner.
C. Keywords and Copy
Focusing on the "reasonably prudent consumer,""' keywords

and copy-at most-can only spur initial interest confusion. The
initial interest confusion doctrine originated offline"' but expanded
online at the turn of the century. The Supreme Court has never
considered the doctrine,152 but others courts have found initial
In Planned
interest confusion actionable on the Web.'53
ParenthoodFederation of America v. Bucci, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York found initial interest
confusion actionable because "Internet users who seek [the]
plaintiffs web site [may] expend time and energy accessing
defendant's web site."'5 4 However, initial interest confusion
should have no bearing in keyword cases. First, initial interest
confusion should have never been applied to the Web in the first
place. As stated in Bihari v. Gross, "[t]he harm caused by a
misleading billboard on the highway is difficult to correct. In
contrast, on the information superhighway, resuming one's search
for the correct website [only requires] one click of the mouse and a
few seconds of delay."'" The Planned Parenthood holding is
150. Id. "Unreasonable, imprudent and inexperienced web-shoppers are not
relevant." Id.
151. See generally Grotrian, Helfferich, Schultz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
152. Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1370 (2007).
153. See, e.g., Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d. 808, 81213 (7th Cir. 2002); Checkpoint Sys. v. Check Point Software Tech., Inc., 269
F.3d 270, 293 (3d Cir. 2001); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.
v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997).
154. PlannedParenthood,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *39.
155. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y 2000). See
also Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa.
2001) ("Internet surfers are inured to the false starts and excursions awaiting
them .... ).
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faulty because the mere seconds it takes a searcher to click on a
counterfeiter's conquesting ad is not sufficient "time and energy"
to be legally cognizable.
Second, "because the sine qua non of trademark infringement is
consumer confusion, when [a court] examine[s] initial interest
confusion, the owner of the mark must demonstrate likely
confusion, not mere diversion.""' What happens on the SERP is
no more than diversion. If a searcher is diverted by a conquesting
ad and unknowingly purchases a counterfeit product, it is the
landing page that confused the consumer to a cognizable level, not
the search ad. In Playboy, the concurrence likened the experience
of viewing clearly-labeled paid search ads to shopping at a
physical store:
I walk into Macy's and ask for the Calvin Klein
section and am directed upstairs to the second floor.
Once I get to the second floor, on my way to the
Calvin Klein section, I notice a more prominently
displayed line of Charter Club clothes, Macy's own
brand, designed to appeal to the same people
attracted by the style of Calvin Klein's latest line of
clothes. Let's say I get diverted from my goal of
reaching the Calvin Klein section, the Charter Club
stuff looks good enough to me, and I purchase some
Charter Club shirts instead. Has Charter Club or
Macy's infringed Calvin Klein's trademark, simply
by having another product more prominently
displayed before one reaches the Klein line?
Certainly not.'"

The Playboy concurrence and the Ninth Circuit in Network
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc. emphasized
that the initial interest confusion doctrine should not apply to

156. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d
1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011).
157. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1035 (Berzon, J., concurring).
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situations where the consumer should know that a paid search ad is
not associated with the trademark holder.'
Today's Internet consumer is sophisticated enough to not need
the protection of the initial interest confusion doctrine, even when
it comes to confusion as to sponsorship (which the Fourth Circuit
was concerned about in Rosetta Stone). The Ninth Circuit
illustrated why initial interest cannot cause confusion as to
sponsorship in Toyota Motor Sales, US.A., Inc. v. Tabari:
[R]easonable, prudent and experienced internet
consumers are accustomed to such exploration by
trial and error. They skip from site to site, ready to
hit the back button whenever they're not satisfied
with a site's contents. They fully expect to find
some sites that aren't what they imagine . . . .
[C]onsumers don't form any firm expectations
about the sponsorship of a website until they 've
seen the landingpage-ifthen.'59

Based on these theories, Tabari held that it was unlikely that
reasonably prudent consumers would be confused into thinking the
domain name "buy-a-lexus.com" was associated with Lexus"[c]onsumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite
sophisticated about such matters.""'o The Fourth Circuit's decision
in Rosetta Stone stands in direct conflict to Tabari. In Tabari, the
Ninth Circuit held that reasonably prudent consumers would not be
confused into thinking that "buy-a-lexus.com" was associated with
Lexus;"' in Rosetta Stone, the Fourth Circuit held that reasonably
prudent consumers could be confused into thinking that
bossdisk.com-the site where one of the consumers who testified
had purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone software-was associated
with Rosetta Stone.'62 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit focused
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1147; Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034-35.
Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1179 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1178.
Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *26.
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only on the sponsorship confusion caused by the conquesting ad,
not the landing page. The fact is-without going to a landing
page-even sophisticated searchers generally do not quickly scan
search engine listings and make a definitive decision as to weather
a reseller/affiliate/distributor/aggregator/counterfeiter is associated
with a trademark holder. If a searcher ends up thinking that
bossdisk.com is associated with Rosetta Stone, it is because
bossdisk.com's landing pages convinced him, not the conquesting
ad. Conquesting ads do not confuse as to sponsorship, even if
those ads contain trademarks in their copy.
Not only does the initial interest confusion doctrine risk
allowing mark owners to monopolize the SERP, but its
applicability to search engines is highly questionable. Thus, the
doctrine should, not be used in keyword cases.
D. The Keyword Suggestion Tool
There is no doubt that some AdWords advertisers-like
counterfeiters and rogue affiliates-engage in direct trademark
infringement.
But Google does not engage in contributory
infringement because it does not, per Inwood, "intentionally
induce" or continue to supply its service to advertisers it knew or
had reason to know were infringing.16 3
However, trademark owners have argued that the Google
Keyword Suggestion Tool constitutes inducement because it
directs or influences advertisers to bid on others' marks.'" When
considering the operation of the Keyword Suggestion Tool in
practice, this argument falls apart. The Keyword Suggestion Tool
suggests keywords related to an advertiser's product that the
advertiser may want to bid on to engage consumers. These
suggestions can include the trademarks of the advertiser's
competitors.
For sophisticated search engine marketers, the
Keyword Suggestion Tool is just one of many inputs in building a
robust paid search keyword list. Other inputs include customer
163. See Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 854.
164. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (rejecting the notion that
the Keyword Suggestion Tool directed or influenced others to bid on Rosetta
Stone's marks).
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research, social listening data, competitive research, third-party
keyword generation tools, native site search query lists (i.e. what
consumers search for when on the advertiser's site) and lists of
keywords that drive organic search traffic.
Once an advertiser combines all of these inputs, it may decide to
bid on a competitor's mark. The Keyword Suggestion Tool should
Bidding on a
not, and does not, influence this decision.
competitor's trademark is a calculated, strategic decision that
could spur a bidding war or put the advertiser's own marks at risk.
Notwithstanding size or sophistication, no advertisers blindly bid
on others' trademarks just because the Keyword Suggestion Tool
told them to. Many advertisers do not want to initiate a bidding
war with a competitor because CPCs could rise, ultimately costing
both parties. The only party that wins in a bidding war is Google.
Thus, a brand may make a decision to bid on another's markperhaps to establish itself in a new industry, increase visibility in a
new market, or counter-bid on a competitor-but this is a highly
calculated and potentially dangerous decision that is made outside
the Keyword Suggestion Tool.
Furthermore, the Keyword Suggestion Tool argument is
especially weak when applied to counterfeiters. Counterfeiters do
not need the tool to suggest that they bid on the brand they are
They are pretending to be that brand!
counterfeiting.
Additionally, even if the tool was to suggest that a counterfeiter
bid on a keyword like "fake Louis Vuitton," this does not
implicate consumer confusion. A consumer searching for "fake
Louis Vuitton" is looking for fake Louis Vuitton and obviously
wants to see search results from counterfeiters. This is unjust
enrichment by the counterfeiter, but "unjust enrichment instinct
runs counter to the core values of trademark law.""'
E. The Display ofBrands in Proximity to Each Other
Trademark law should not coddle consumers."' Consumers use
search engines to comparison shop, which includes evaluating
165. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 53, at 783.
166. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L.
REv. 413,438(2009).
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different brands. They are sophisticated enough to distinguish
between different brands on the SERP, and "[i]f they see
trademarks that overlap, they will adapt and deal with that

environment."

67

Consumers understand retail shelf space, and Google is a digital
shelf. Consumers are not confused about Advil's relationship with
Tylenol when they see the two brands beside each other on a
drugstore shelf. They understand product proximity on physical
store shelves because the law has long permitted it.168 The context
of the SERP is different from the physical store shelf, 69 but from
the consumer's perspective, the SERP "replicate[s] the experience
of consumers learning about competitive options from the side-byside in-store display of competitive products."7 o Additionally,
"there is no reason to believe that consumers have a clearer
understanding
of retailing practices
than of online
intermediation.""' For instance-unbeknownst to consumersone brand may be paying the drugstore to be placed in a certain
position on the shelf.
Of course, the SERP may confuse some inexperienced
searchers. But these inexperienced searchers are outliers and thus
irrelevant.172 Additionally, courts have often discounted evidence
of actual confusion in trademark cases "because [the evidence]
was unclear or insubstantial." 73 Even if a trademark owner can
prove that a few consumers (perhaps those that testified in Rosetta
Stone) are actually confused by the proximity of brands on the
167. Id. at 439.
168. Id. at 439-40.
169. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark
Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1703, 1720 (2006) ("Courts should not
automatically assume that proximity in the offline environment and proximity in
the offline environment have the same effects. The context is different, and
there are great risks in taking analogies too seriously.").
170. Goldman, supranote 140, at 399.
171. Id. at 410-11.
Furthermore, "consumers often do not actually
understand retailers' merchandising practices any better than they understand
keyword triggering, either because the practices are relatively recent or
unknown-such as slotting fees and category management-or because
consumers simply do not think about them." Id. at 411 (footnote omitted).
172. See Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1176.
173. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
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SERP (or as to sponsorship), it should not matter because
trademark law tolerates some confusion.
Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley note that courts
"must keep in mind that they are more than enforcers of existing
norms-they are norm creators, in the sense that the rules they
develop will determine practices on the Web and whether the
Internet realizes its potential as a vast clearinghouse of information
and content."' 7 4 By finding no confusion in shelf placement cases,
courts created the norm that different brands could be placed in
proximity on store shelves.' As a result, stores are not forced to
separate different brands into different aisles, and consumers have
an efficient means by which to shop-the ability to view and
compare all the brands in a product category in one place.' And
those consumers are not confused. By finding no confusion in
keyword cases, courts can reflect the norm that the SERP is used
to compare brands side by side.
Trademark owners also regularly pay to appear in close
proximity to their competitors in print ads, print directories,
television ads, and even on the same NASCAR.'n "Physical
proximity creates an association between the concepts, but not
If trademark owners
necessarily an association as to source."'
can pay to appear next to each other offline, they should be able to
Physical proximity of brands does not
do the same online.'
confuse reasonable consumers. Thus, the Lanham Act "should not
be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence
to purchasers."'"g

174. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 53, at 784 (emphasis added).
175. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 166, at 439-40.
176. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring). "[S]uch choices do not constitute
trademark infringement off the internet, and I cannot understand why they
should on the internet." Id.
177. With all the ads on a NASCAR, how could some of the advertisers not
be competitors?
178. Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375, 1391 (2010).
179. See id. at 1392.
180. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33
(2003).
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In Rosetta Stone, the Fourth Circuit focused on evidence that
searchers buying counterfeit Rosetta Stone software through
sponsored links believed that the counterfeiter was a Rosetta Stone
affiliate or reseller.'1'
Counterfeiters, rogue affiliates and
unauthorized resellers can create initial interest confusion as to
sponsorship on the SERP by including others' trademarks in their
ad copy. However, this is against Google policy. Google allows
advertisers to use others' trademarks in their ad copy only if the
advertiser is actually a reseller of the trademarked product (not to
mention, Google does not allow advertising from counterfeiters).
Google's policy is not intended to-and does not actually-create
confusion as to sponsorship; the counterfeiter evades Google's
policies and creates this confusion. Therefore, if Google is liable
at all, it should only be liable for contributory infringement. And
Google is not liable for contributory infringement because it does
not intentionally induce infringers or continue to supply its
services to known infringers.
F. The Presentationof Search Results
Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis note that
trademark law could be valuable in regulating the way search
They argue that "regulating the
engines present results.82
presentation of results by a search engine goes more directly to the
core of trademark law; the effect on consumers is less attenuated
than in addressing sales policies and practices by search
engines.""' Professors Dinwoodie and Janis suggest that paid
search conquesting would be less likely to confuse consumers if
search engines clearly differentiated between paid and organic
results.'84 The Fourth Circuit, in Rosetta Stone, suggested the same
thing: "The evidence also includes an internal Google study
reflecting that even well-educated, seasoned Internet consumers
are confused by the nature of Google's sponsored links and are

181.
182.
183.
184.

Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *25.
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 143, at 1635.
Id.
Id.
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sometimes even unaware that sponsored links are, in actuality,
advertisements."'8 5
There is no doubt that Google is increasingly making its topsponsored paid results look more like organic results. Topsponsored paid results are the ads-up to three-that appear above
the organic search results, as opposed to the other paid search ads
that appear on the right side. Making top-sponsored ads look like
organic listings can confuse consumers into clicking on the ads.
This boosts click revenue for Google. In 2011, Google made a
number of changes to its top-sponsored ads to make them look-in
some cases-identical to organic results. Google lowercased paid
search display URLs to match organic search URLs, allowed topsponsored advertisers to use longer paid search ad titles to match
organic search titles, lightened the top-sponsored box's color, and
changed the box's right-side label from "Sponsored Listings" to
the less noticeable "Ads." 86 But this issue is beyond the scope of
trademark law. Google is making all top-sponsored ads look like
organic results: (1) ads keyed to others' trademarks, (2) ads keyed
to trademark owners' own marks, and (3) ads keyed to generic
keywords. As of January 2011, only two percent of U.S. searches
for the fifty largest global brand names returned conquesting ads.'
Thus, consumer confusion as to whether a listing is an ad or an
organic result is much more likely to occur for ads keyed to
trademark owners' own marks or generic keywords.
A conquesting ad is also the least likely to confuse a consumer
as to whether the listing is paid or organic. For example, a May
2011 search for the generic keyword "language learning" returned
a top-sponsored paid search ad (from the Pimsleur brand) that
looked remarkably like an organic search listing.'" A searcher
185. Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *36 (emphasis added).
186. See Craig Greenfield, Blurring the Lines Between Paid and Natural
Search Listings: The Impact on Search Performance, EMARKETING &
COMMERCE (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.emarketingandcommerce.com/
blog/the-impact-search-performance-craig-greenfield.
187. LUCILLA DE SARLO, USING COMPETITORS' TRADEMARKS IN YOUR PAID
SEARCH

STRATEGY

2-3

(2011),

available at http://www.forrester.com

/rb/Research/usingcompetitorstrademarks in paid search strategy/q/id/5828
6/t/2 (subscription required).
188. Screenshot on file with author.
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could very well think that the Pimsleur ad was an organic listing.
But, if Pimsleur were bidding on its competitor's trademarked
keyword ("Rosetta Stone"), consumers would be less likely to
think that the Pimsleur ad was an organic listing. First, Pimsleur's
conquesting ad is unlikely to become eligible to display in the top
three sponsored ads above the organic results. For an ad to display
above the organic results, it must exceed a certain Quality Scoreor relevancy"'-threshold.'9 0 It is possible that the conquesting ad
could exceed that threshold but, normally, the threshold is only
exceeded by the brand itself, an authorized affiliate, or a reseller
with a strong Quality Score (like Amazon)."' Consumers are not
likely to click on competitor (or counterfeiter) conquesting ads at
high enough rates to deem the ads exceedingly relevant. Thuseven if Pimsleur were the only advertiser bidding on "Rosetta
Stone"-the Pimsleur conquesting ad would theoretically only
display to the right of the organic search results.'92 Right-side
Google ads are much more clearly defined as ads, and consumers
know from experience that right-side listings are always ads.
Secondly, a reasonably prudent consumer may wonder why his
"Rosetta Stone" query returned a listing for Pimsleur; the obvious
answer is that the Pimsleur listing is an ad and not an organic
189. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
190. Improvements to Ad Quality, supra note 22.
191. For a rare example of conquesting ads showing in the top-sponsored
results, see Craig Greenfield, Genuine Strategies to Outsmart Paid Search
Counterfeiters, EMARKETING
&
COMMERCE
(June
16,
2011),
http://www.emarketingandcommerce.com/blog/genuine-strategies-outsmartpaid-search-counterfeiters (showing a screenshot of counterfeiters occupying the
top three paid search positions for a "coach bags" query).
192. This being said, counterfeiters do attempt to "game" Quality Score to
increase relevancy and serve in the top-sponsored listings. A counterfeiter
could try to evade Google by using another site's domain name in its ad URL,
potentially piggybacking on that domain's Quality Score. To illustrate, in
September 2011, a Rosetta Stone counterfeiter was using the URL of electronic
retailer Fry's ("Frys.com") in its ad. Although the ad URL was "Frys.com,"
anyone who clicked on the ad was redirected to the counterfeiter's site, JustRosetta.com. The ad served in the top-sponsored listings presumably due to
Fry's Quality Score. Of course, this is against Google's policies, but the
counterfeiter was able to slip by Google undetected. Screenshots on file with
author.
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result. This is less apparent when a search for "Pimsleur" or
"language learning" returns a Pimsleur listing, which is more
relevant to the searcher's query.
Of course, there are outliers such as the inexperienced searcher
who does not understand that right-side listings are ads or the
unauthorized conquestor that somehow gains a high enough
Quality Score to show in the top-sponsored box. But keyword
courts should take a cue from the Supreme Court's decision in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.'93 In Samara, the
Court held that "given the unlikelihood of inherently sourceidentifying design" it would not be worth allowing suit based on
alleged inherent distinctiveness.19 4 The Court stated that in order
to preserve competition, product design courts-in close cases"should err on the side of caution."' 9 5 Likewise, keyword courts
should not allow unlikely or close cases to chill healthy SERP
competition.
Liability based on outliers threatens to limit
consumer choice on the SERP and curb innovation in the space.
Google's unclear differentiation between top-sponsored ads and
organic listings is an irrelevant issue to trademark law and
conquesting. However, it is relevant to non-conquesting ads,
Because clear
which make up the large majority of ads.
differentiation is beyond conquesting, it is outside the scope of
trademark law and should be addressed by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") or the Lanham Act's false advertising
provisions."'
G. Easing Concerns Around Not Using Trademark Law to
Regulate Conquesting
Trademark owners and scholars have raised a number of
concerns around not using trademark law to regulate conquesting.
The two primary concerns are (1) information overload that may

193. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205
(2000).
194. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 215.
196. See Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 135, 140 (2010).
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increase consumer search costs and (2) allowing Google too much
power over trademark owners. These concerns do not justify the
risk of giving trademark owners a monopoly on the SERP.
Additionally, market forces, not potential liability, are most likely
to deter search engines from confusing consumers.
H. PaidSearch ConquestingDoes Not Cause Information
Overload
Trademark use theorists, who are in favor of complete immunity
for search engines, argue that conquesting fosters more
information about products, and more information is always better
for consumers.197 Those who oppose the trademark use doctrine
argue that trademark law's primary purpose is not more
information-"its core focus is on the nature and quality of the
information for which it facilitates production."'
Thus, use
theory opponents suggest that unregulated conquesting could cause
information overload that increases consumer search costs.'9 9
On the SERP, more information is not better for consumers. But
unregulated conquesting does not cause information overload.
Search engines, like trademark law, are not predicated on the
notion that more information is better. Search engines, like
trademark law, strive to promote the flow of relevant, helpful
information-the only information that matters to consumers.
Google uses consumers to regulate SERP information volume.
For example, imagine if the Yankees attempted to sell t-shirts by
bidding on the "Red Sox" trademark. "Red Sox" searcherspresumably Red Sox fans-would consider the Yankees's ad to be
irrelevant at the very least, and perhaps even offensive. They
would not click on it. Even if consumers were diverted into
clicking on the Yankees's ad because they thought it was a Red
Sox ad, they would quickly bounce from the Yankees's landing
page (and maybe go take a shower). Consequently, the ad's
Quality Score-which incorporates click-through and landing page
bounce rates-would be so poor that Google would stop
197. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 53, at 795.
198. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 143, at 1622.
199. Id.
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displaying the ad. In this extreme example, consumer cues
indicated that the additional information on the SERP (i.e. the
Yankees's ad) was not relevant or helpful, so the information was
eliminated via Quality Score. In the short-term, the SERP gave
consumers more choice (i.e. the Yankees's ad). But soon after,
consumer relevancy cues narrowed that choice. Consumers do not
need trademark law to help narrow their SERP choices.
Landing page quality is a particularly important aspect of
Quality Score that helps keep consumers in control of SERP
information volume. If consumers bounce from a counterfeiter's
landing page because they realize the page is fake, the
counterfeiter's ad will suffer. Clicks will either become too
expensive for the counterfeiter to efficiently advertise, or Google
will stop displaying the ad altogether. Not to mention, Google will
stop displaying the ad anyway when it realizes it is from a
counterfeiter.
Google's Quality Score approach, which rewards relevancy,
aligns with the Tiffany and Rosetta Stone district court approaches
that private market forces will control conquestor listings, not
trademark law.200 Google cannot risk alienating its consumers by
giving them a SERP full of irrelevant listings; if it does, Google
will lose search share and revenue. So, through Quality Score and
other relevancy indicators like the +1 Button,20' Google gives
control to the consumer. If the consumer indicates that an ad is
irrelevant, it becomes harder and more expensive for that ad to
maintain rank, and the ad may even fall off the SERP.
On the SERP, consumers regulate the amount of information
they wish to see. Trademark law therefore should not interfere
decisions regarding information from
with consumers'
Holding search engines liable for providing
conquestors.
consumers with information that they want-and getting rid of
information that they do not want-does not align with protecting
consumers.

200. See Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010); Rosetta
Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (E.D. Va. 2010).
201. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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L The Theory ofPotentialLiability
Professors Dinwoodie and Janis have advocated for potential
liability as a proactive disciplinary tool for search engines.202
Similarly, Professor Greg Lastowka has argued that "the mere
knowledge that trademark law stands ready to curb abusive index
practices may have an ameliorate effect on the commercial
conduct of Google and other search engines."203 But the threat of
potential liability in keyword cases has not deterred Google. In
fact, we have seen just the opposite. In April 2009, Rescuecom
was decided, killing the trademark use doctrine and opening
Google to potential liability under the consumer confusion
standard. 204 But Google was not deterred. A month later, Google
changed its trademark bidding policy to allow advertisers to use
competitors' trademarks in ad copy.205 And in September 2010, it
liberalized its trademark policy in Western Europe.206
Proponents of potential liability argue that market forces alone
cannot serve to discipline search engines.207 While potential
liability could help, it is evident in Google's situation that market
forces are a stronger deterrent. Google's biggest worry is not
litigation. Rather, it worries that advertisers are shifting budgets to
Bing because Bing is gaining search market share.208 It worries
that people are now spending more time on Facebook than
Google,209 and that Facebook is primed to become the next great
advertising platform. To stay relevant, Google must deliver the

202. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 169, at 1717.
203. Lastowka, supra note 152, at 1409.
204. See generally Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
2009).
205. DE SARLO, supra note 187, at 1.
206. Id.
207. See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 169, at 1719.
208. Matt Rosoff, Study Shows Bing Is More Accurate than Google, and It's
Gaining Share, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2011, 6:22 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bing-more-accurate-than-google-and-gainingshare-2011-2.
209. Stan Schroeder, Web Users Now Spend More Time on Facebook Than
http://mashable.com/2010/
10,
2010),
(Sept.
MASHABLE
Google,
09/1 0/facebook-overtakes-google/.
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most relevant search results. If Google presents results in a way
that confuses or frustrates users, it will lose market share. If it
loses market share, it will lose advertisers. And if it loses
advertisers, it will lose money. In its quests to index all of the
world's information and dominate advertiser wallet share, Google
has always pushed the boundaries of intellectual property law
without fear.210 For instance, consider an April 2012 Google job
posting for Trademark Counsel:
20th century laws don't always solve 21st century
problems, and Google Legal crafts innovative
approaches for tackling some of the toughest legal
challenges

of the information age.

. . . Our

innovative services raise challenging questions that
demand creative and practical answers. We provide
those answers by working at the crossroads of the
law and new technology.2 1'

Google has even made top-sponsored ads look increasingly like
organic results to boost revenue 2 12 despite the FTC's
recommendation that search engines clearly delineate between ads
and organic results. 213 Google is not only transforming the Web, it
210. See generally Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (authors and publishers alleged that Google violated the
Copyright Act by planning to digitize millions of books); Rosetta Stone, 730 F.
Supp. 2d 531; Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (owners of copyrighted videos alleged that YouTube violated
their rights by allowing users to upload their videos free of charge); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2008 WL 4217837 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (Perfect 10 alleged that Google was liable for copyright and
trademark infringement for indexing Perfect 10's images in the search results).
211. GOOGLE

JOBS,

Trademark

Counsel-

Mountain

View,

http://www.google.com/intl/en/jobs/uslocations/mountain-view/legal/trademarkcounsel-mountain-view/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
212. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
213. See Lastowka, supra note 152, at 1345 (citing Letter from Heather
Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm'n Div. of Adver. Practices, to
Gary Ruskin, Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), available at
staff
("[T]he
http://www.commercialalert.org/PDFs/ftcresponse.pdf
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is transforming the law. Google will stop pushing the legal
boundaries of keyword advertising if the market or its consumers
tell it to, not when threatened with liability.
J. Google's Power over Advertisers Is Not an Issuefor Trademark
Law
Rosetta Stone argued that Google changed its trademark policy
to help third parties misappropriate Rosetta Stone's marks, thus
increasing Google's revenue.2 14 Many trademark owners feel
compelled to bid on their marks to protect against conquestors.2 5
This transfers wealth from the trademark owners to Google.
Conquesting can also inflate CPCs, which makes Google richer.2 16
But just because Google makes more money does not mean that it
is liable for trademark infringement.217 If advertisers are being
held hostage by Google's 66.4 percent search market share,218 that
is an issue for antitrust law, not trademark law.2 19
Some advertisers complain that Google is extorting them. But
Google only created the medium. The advertisers' consumers use
the medium in droves because it provides the most relevant
answers to their queries. Thus, the responsible advertiser must
follow its consumer to Google the same way it follows its
consumer to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, NYTimes.com, the
Super Bowl, the newspaper, or the local grocery store. This all
costs the advertiser money. And depending on consumer demand
recommends that if your search engine uses paid placement, you make any
changes to the presentation of your paid-ranking search results that would be
necessary to clearly delineate them as such, whether they are segregated from,
or inserted into, non-paid listings.")).
214. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39.
215. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
217. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 542 ("[E]vidence that Google stands
to make more money under its current trademark policy, absent more, cannot
meet [the plaintiffs] burden of proving that Google used the [plaintiffs marks]
with intent to confuse the buying public.").
218. comScore, supra note 14.
219. That being said, Microsoft controls the rest of the search market, and it
has the same trademark policies. See Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra
note 33.
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for the medium, the advertiser will encounter more competition,
thus higher advertising prices. For instance, it costs more to run a
commercial during the NBA Playoffs than the PBA Playoffs
(assuming the PBA has playoffs). Google paid search costs more
than Twitter paid search. Of course, advertisers would like to rely
less on Google, but for the time being their consumers do not give
them that choice. This is not Google's problem; it is the
advertiser's challenge.
Search engine advertisers need to help themselves rather than
expect trademark law to do the work. To illustrate, an advertiser
could conduct a test to determine if bidding on its brand name
makes financial sense. The advertiser may find that it is paying for
paid search clicks when, in the absence of ads keyed to its brand
name, consumers would just click at the same rate on the
advertiser's "free" organic listing. This advertiser could then
employ paid search monitoring tools-like AdGooroo 2 20-- which
alert the advertiser when someone else is bidding on its brand. If
alerted, the advertiser can give notice of infringement by a
counterfeiter to the search engine, throw a rogue affiliate out of its
affiliate program, or defend against a critic or competitor.
Opponents of conquesting may respond that this places
responsibility on brand owners to police their marks online. But
responsible brand owners-large and small-should police their
marks online, no matter how difficult that may be. This allows
brand owners to not only uncover infringement, but also determine
what consumers are saying about their brands. Consumer insights
can influence marketing and customer service strategies.
Additionally, search engines should, and do, police the SERP to
provide consumers with the most relevant results. Google takes
sufficient means to prevent infringing ads. It prohibits advertisers
it
from violating third-party intellectual property rights.22 '
evaluates all ads that contain trademarks before pushing the ads
live.222 It has technological means by which to check landing
220. ADGOOROo TRADEMARK MONITORING, http://www.adgooroo.com/
products/trademark monitoring.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
221. AdWords Terms and Conditions, GOOGLE, https://adwords.
google.com/select/tsandcsfinder (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
222. See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
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pages.223 And it removes infringing ads upon the request of
trademark owners.224
Still, some infringing ads make their way to the SERP.
Consider some of the evidence "relevant" to contributory
infringement as cited by the Fourth Circuit in Rosetta Stone:
"Rosetta Stone notified Google of approximately 200 instances of
[counterfeiter ads]. Rosetta Stone contends that even after being
notified of these websites, Google continued to allow Sponsored
Links for other websites by these same advertisers."225
To
illustrate: (1) Rosetta Stone notified Google of counterfeiter ads,
(2) Google removed the ads and blocked the domains, (3) the same
counterfeiter set up on different domains and ran new ads, and (4)
the Fourth Circuit stated that Google's failure to remove the new
ads was relevant to Rosetta Stone's contributory infringement
claim. In other words, the Fourth Circuit suggested that Google
may have to actively seek out counterfeiters by somehow
determining exactly who registered a domain and then banning
that registrant from AdWords. This is not only (likely) impossible,
but completely irrational because all the counterfeiter has to do is
register domains under various fake names. If Google is burdened
by this (or by strict notice and takedown) to avoid contributory
liability, it has no choice but to over-enforce through automation
or to stop allowing conquesting completely. This would possibly
disallow non-infringing, valuable ads like the ASPCA's Purina
recall ad.226
Search engine marketing is not easy. Trademark owners must
devise strategies to maximize consumer engagement while
minimizing advertising costs. But they do not have the right to
employ trademark law to monopolize SERP goodwill. And
because search engine practices do not confuse consumers,
trademark owners cannot rely on courts to stop conquestors.
223. See id.
224. Targeting Websites Dedicated to Stealing American Intellectual
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011)
(statement of Tom Adams, CEO, Rosetta Stone) (noting that Google takes
between one day and one month to remove infringing links upon Rosetta
Stone's request).
225. Rosetta Stone, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 at *46 (emphasis added).
226. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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IV. PRESERVING THE FUTURE OF SEARCH

We live in a search-driven world. And where there is search,
there is a market for keyword advertising. We are currently in the
midst of a fundamental shift in how consumers find things online.
Consumers are moving away from traditional search engines to
social networking sites. They now spend more time on Facebook
than they do on Google.22 7 Social networking sites help consumers
find and evaluate brands through friend recommendations and
reviews. And where consumers go, keyword advertising has
followed. Facebook enables advertisers to trigger ads based on
keywords-including likes and interests-contained in user
profiles. Twitter allows advertisers to run "Promoted Tweets"
triggered by users' Twitter Search keywords. Keywords within
YouTube Search trigger video ads. More sophisticated keyword
advertisers are following searchers from the SERP to other sites.
With capabilities like Yahoo! search retargeting, an advertiser can
cookie a consumer who searches for a particular keyword (perhaps
its competitor's trademark) on Yahoo!228 and later target a display
ad at that consumer while he browses a page on Yahoo!'s
network.2 29
Trademark law's goals are to prevent consumer confusion and
encourage competition,23 0 which spurs innovation. In the keyword
context, trademark law should not be used to restrict competition
and innovation, especially in the absence of consumer confusion.
Trademark law should reflect the societal norm that, through
search, advertisers sell things in proximity to each other and
unconfused consumers find those things.
Overly-aggressive
trademark law should not seek to change this norm. The threat of
direct or contributory liability for keyword-based advertising
services chills innovation against the best interests of consumers.

227. Schroeder, supra note 209.
228. See Yahoo!'s Retargeting Advertising Solution, YAHOO! ADVERTISING
http://advertising.yahoo.com/products-solutions/retargeting.html
SOLUTIONS,
(last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
229. See id.
230. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 300
(9th Cir. 1979).
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As stated by the Supreme Court in Samara: "Competition is
deterred, however, not merely by successful suit but by the
plausible threat of successful suit." 231
Innovation in the keyword advertising space is also beneficial to
trademark owners.
For instance, as keyword advertising
progresses into its next generation, mark owners will be able to
better diversify their keyword advertising budgets. As Facebook
and Twitter develop viable, efficient keyword-advertising
platforms, trademark owners could be less reliant on Google.
Competition between keyword-advertising platforms would lower
CPCs and give Google less control over mark owners.
V. CONCLUSION
After Rescuecom, the trademark use doctrine is dead. The
functionality doctrine is misplaced as applied to defendants, the
search engines. And the initial interest confusion doctrine is
inadequate.
That leaves trademark owners who wish to
monopolize use of their marks on the SERP with two options: (1)
show that search engine practices confuse-not divert-a
reasonable number of prudent, experienced web-shoppers or (2)
prove that Google is liable for contributory infringement. But
Google's policies do not cause confusion. And Google is not
helping advertisers to infringe; it is working against infringement.
Given the lack of consumer confusion-and the importance of
encouraging competition and innovation-the game of allowing
trademark owners to sue search engines in an effort to monopolize
the SERP is not worth the candle. The Fourth Circuit should not
have needlessly extended this game.
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